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Tempo-Adjusted Period Parity Progression Measures: Assessing the
Implications of Delayed Childbearing for Cohort Fertility in Sweden,
the Netherlands and Spain
Hans-Peter Kohler1 Jos´ e Antonio Ortega2
Abstract
In this paper we apply tempo-adjusted period parity progression ratios (Kohler and Or-
tega 2002) to Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain. These countries represent three distinct
demographic patterns in contemporary Europe and are of particular interest for demogra-
phers. The goal of our analyses is to (a) describe past fertility trends in these countries in
terms of synthetic cohorts and (b) project the level and distribution of completed fertility
in cohorts who have not ﬁnished childbearing. Our analyses suggest that the most recent
period fertility patterns in these countries do not imply substantial increases in childless-
ness even in younger cohorts. Moreover, if these patterns prevail in the future, young
cohorts would reach completed fertility levels between 1.5–1.75.
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1 Introduction
European fertility patterns during the last two decades have been characterized by a con-
siderable and persistent heterogeneity that is contrary to earlier expectations based on the
Second Demographic Transition theory (Billari and Wilson 2001; Lesthaeghe and van de
Kaa 1986; van de Kaa 1987). On the one hand, the total fertility rate in Southern, Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe has declined to unprecedented low levels, and lowest-low fertility
with a TFR below 1.3 has become a widespread phenomenon in these regions (Kohler
et al. 2001 a). On the other hand, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, who were
amongtheforerunnersoftheSecondDemographicTransitionandtheinitialemergenceof
below-replacement fertility, have reversed their relative position in Europe and exhibit rel-
atively high fertility in the 1990s (Council of Europe 2000). This group of ‘high fertility’
countries in Europe is also joined by countries such as France (Toulemon 2001), while
neighboring Germany can be considered as a candidate for lowest-low fertility (Kohler
et al. 2001 a).
The appropriate description and measurement of fertility constitutes an essential step
in the empirical and theoretical analysis of the above patterns in Europe, or in other re-
gions that experience similar developments. In particular, the challenge for demographic
analysis includes the decomposition of these heterogeneous fertility patterns into their
behavioral and demographic determinants, and the assessment of recent period develop-
ments in terms of their implications for cohort fertility. The latter question has induced
a renewed interest in issues of fertility measurement in low and lowest-low fertility con-
texts due to the potential divergence of period and cohort fertility patterns (e.g., Bongaarts
and Feeney 1998; Kohler and Ortega 2002; Ortega and Kohler 2002 a,b; van Imhoff
2001). [Note 1]
The current debate about the measurement of fertility is particularly concerned with
the implications of postponed childbearing, which is frequently associated with the trend
towards low and lowest-low fertility, on cohort and period fertility levels. Despite the al-
mostunanimousagreementamongdemographersthatthepostponementoranticipationof
fertility distorts period fertility measures such as the total fertility rate, a substantial con-
troversy exists about the appropriate adjustment for these tempo-distortions. Bongaarts
and Feeney (1998) have proposed a counterfactual measure, the adjusted total fertility
rate, which is equal to the total fertility rate (TFR) that would have been observed in a
calendar year if there had been no delay of childbearing. Despite its merits, the adjusted
TFR has been criticized for its potentially distorted inference of tempo changes and its
unclear interpretation in terms of cohort fertility (Kim and Schoen 2000; Kohler and Or-
tega 2002; Ortega and Kohler 2002 a,b; van Imhoff and Keilman 2000). In particular, the
adjustment of the TFR ignores—just like the total fertility rate itself—the sequencing of
births, i.e., the fact that only women who are currently at parity zero, one, two, etc., are at
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risk of giving birth to their ﬁrst, second, third, etc., child. In many circumstances, there-
fore, neither the adjusted TFR nor the standard TFR may reﬂect the parity distribution
and the completed cohort fertility that are implied by the age- and parity speciﬁc birth
probabilities observed in a given calendar year.
In order to overcome some of these limitations, we have recently extended the tempo-
adjustment of period fertility measures to parity progression ratios (Kohler and Ortega
2002). Speciﬁcally, our period parity progression measures reﬂect the level, timing and
distribution of cohort fertility associated with the level, tempo, and postponement pattern
of fertility in a given calendar year. These measures therefore provide a new and uni-
ﬁed ‘tool-kit’ of period fertility measures to (a) describe past fertility trends in terms of
synthetic cohorts who experience the current period-level and postponement of fertility
during their life-course, and (b) project the level and distribution of completed fertility in
cohorts who have not ﬁnished childbearing based on the period fertility pattern observed
in the last calendar year for which data are available.
These analytic abilities of tempo-adjusted parity progression ratios allow us to investi-
gate three questions that are of central relevance for the assessment of contemporary low
and lowest-low fertility. First, how does the description of fertility trends change once
the analysis is conducted in terms of synthetic cohort fertility, and how do the inferences
based on the adjusted TFR and those obtained from period parity progression measures
differ? Second, what inferences can be made about the completed fertility and the ﬁnal
parity distribution of cohorts who have not ﬁnished childbearing as of 1999 on the basis of
the most recent fertility patterns? Third, how does a potential future postponement of fer-
tility, that mirrors the most recent postponement patterns observed in the 1990s, change
the fertility level and parity distribution attained by cohorts as compared to a scenario
where postponement comes to a halt?
In the next section we brieﬂy describe the methods developed in Kohler and Ortega
(2002), and we discuss how these methods can be used to analyze past fertility trends and
to project cohort fertility. Subsequently, we apply these methods to three countries with
very different fertility dynamics in the last decades: Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain.
The ﬁnal section discusses the commonalities and differences between these countries and
concludes with some general remarks about the measurement of fertility in low fertility
contexts.
2 Tempo-Adjusted Period Parity Progression Measures
Our analyses are based on newly introduced tempo-adjusted period parity progression
ratios and related measures that overcome some of the limitations associated with the
adjusted total fertility rate (Kohler and Ortega 2002; for a more general discussion, see
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also Ortega and Kohler 2002 a). In particular, these measures have the following advan-
tages: (a) they possess an explicit interpretation in terms of the level, distribution and
timing of fertility in synthetic cohorts, and they can therefore be used for the analysis of
period fertility trends as well as for the projection of cohort fertility; (b) they are based
on childbearing intensities, instead of conventional age- and order-speciﬁc fertility rates,
and therefore provide an improved inference of the level of fertility and the pace of post-
ponement; and (c) they remove tempo-distortions from the observed fertility patterns and
allow an extrapolation of past or present postponement patterns into the future.
The formal analyses in Kohler and Ortega (2002, henceforth KO) show that the pres-
ence of a fertility postponement distorts the parity progression ratios through two distinct
pathways. On one hand, tempo-distortions in observed period fertility rates lead to an
underestimation of the probability that a woman in the synthetic cohort experiences an-
other birth conditional on her current age and parity. On the other hand, the presence of
a fertility postponement delays the age at which women are exposed to the risk of higher
parity births. This can potentially lead to a reduction of the progression to higher parities,
which we denote as the fertility aging effect associated with a postponement of childbear-
ing. This effect can be partially or totally compensated if the fertility schedule at higher
parities is shifted as a response to the postponement at lower parities. In this case, we
speak of a net fertility aging effect. This effect has not been carefully investigated in ag-
gregate analyses of contemporary fertility patterns, despite the fact that micro-evidence
consistently shows that a later onset of fertility is associated with lower completed fertility
(Billari and Kohler 2002; Kohler et al. 2001 b; Morgan and Rindfuss 1999).
Our extensions of parity progression measures remove the tempo distortion in the
observed childbearing intensities, and they suggest a natural synthetic-cohort measure of
period fertility and quantum, denoted period fertility index, equal to the total fertility of
women who experience the tempo-adjusted period childbearing intensities (or adjusted
age-speciﬁc parity progression probabilities) during their life-course. In addition, our
methods provide direct means to assess the fertility aging effects. This analyses of fertility
aging is possible because the synthetic cohort underlying our period fertility measures
can experience not only the level and timing of fertility observed in a calendar year, but
potentially also the pace of fertility postponement. The analyses of fertility aging then
emerges by contrasting different assumptions about the pace of fertility postponement
during the life-course of synthetic cohorts.
The data required for our analyses then include the births by age and order in a cal-
endar year and a measure of the person-years lived by women who are ‘at risk’ of giving
birth to a ﬁrst, second, third, etc., child. The former information is identical to the data
requirements for the adjustment of the total fertility rate. The latter information is more
speciﬁc. For instance, the exposure can be estimated by the mid-year female population
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by age and parity. In countries with population registers it can be obtained from the exact
counts of the person-years lived by age and parity during a calendar year.
Mostimportantly, theabovedataallowustobaseouranalysesonoccurrence-exposure
rates or childbearing intensities. These intensities reﬂect the ‘hazard’ of experiencing a
next birth at a given age for women who are parity j, j = 0;1;2;:::, in a calendar year.
Because these childbearing intensities relate events to the appropriate measure of expo-
sure, they constitute rates of the ﬁrst kind (taux de premi` ere cat´ egorie; see Henry 1972)
and are preferable to standard age- and order-speciﬁc fertility rates in many applications.
The primary insights in the formal development in Kohler and Ortega (2002) pertain
to the following aspects:
First, the adjustment of the total fertility rates extends directly to childbearing intensi-
ties, and adjusted childbearing intensities can be calculated as m0
j(a;t) = mj(a;t)=(1 ¡
rj(a;t)), where mj(a;t) are the observed childbearing intensities at age a and parity j at
time t, and rj(a;t) is the age-and-period speciﬁc tempo change at parity j.
Second, the age-and-period speciﬁc tempo change rj(a;t) can be inferred from the
mean age and variance of the intensity schedule at parity j. The analyses thus allow
for age-period interactions in the postponement of fertility and account for a potentially
changing variance of the intensity schedule over time (the implementation of variance
changes in our analyses has been transferred from Kohler and Philipov 2001, henceforth
KP).
Third, all period parity progression measures can be derived from the conditional par-
ity progression probability. This conditional parity progression probability is deﬁned as
the likelihood that a woman in a synthetic cohort, who is age x and parity j, progresses to
parityj+1priortoagey byhavinganadditionalchildbetweenagexandy. KOshowthat
the calculation of this conditional parity progression probability can be based on the ad-
justed parity-j childbearing intensities in the reference year T for which the period parity
progression measures are calculated. Moreover, the calculation of the conditional parity
progression probability can incorporate different assumptions about the postponement of
fertility in the synthetic cohort, and this possibility allows us to evaluate the implications
of fertility aging.
Fourth, the adjusted childbearing intensities m0
j(a;t) exceed the observed intensities
mj(a;t) in calendar years with a postponement of fertility. The calculation of the con-
ditional parity progression probability and related measures on the basis of the observed
childbearing intensities, therefore, underestimates the probability of having another child.
In summary, the conditional parity progression probability developed in KO provides
a basis to calculate a variety of parity progression measures with a proper adjustment for
tempo-distortions. In this paper, we concentrate on the following measures to describe
and assess the recent fertility patterns in Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain:
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² period life-time birth probability of one, two,... children: this measure reﬂects the
probability that a woman in the synthetic cohort gives birth to at least one, two,...
children conditional on (a) the parity-speciﬁc level of fertility in the reference year
after removing tempo distortions and (b) the assumed postponement pattern during
the life-course of the synthetic cohort.
² period parity progression ratios (period PPRs): these period PPRs reﬂect the prob-
ability of progressing from parity j to parity j+1 conditional on the level of fertility
observed in the reference year and the assumed postponement pattern during the
life-course of the synthetic cohort.
² index of completed fertility: this index reﬂects the expected number of children for
women in the synthetic cohort conditional on the level of fertility observed in the
reference year and the assumed postponement pattern during the life-course of the
synthetic cohort.
² period fertility index: this is a special case of the above index of completed fer-
tility calculated under the assumption that there is no further change in the timing
of fertility during the life-course of the synthetic cohort; the period fertility index
therefore assumes that women in the synthetic cohort are subject to the tempo-
adjusted period childbearing intensities (for a detailed discussion of the period
fertility index and its usefulness as a period fertility measure, see also Kohler and
Ortega 2002; Ortega and Kohler 2002 a,b).
We report all of these measures for a synthetic cohort who is age 15 in the reference year,
i.e., the cohort who is at the beginning of their childbearing ages in the calendar year for
which our period fertility measures are calculated. [Note 2] Because tempo distortions
are removed in the calculation of the conditional parity progression probability, the above
measures are not biased by the postponement of fertility in the reference year. However,
in order to reveal the extent of tempo-distortions if the postponement of births is ignored
in the calculations, we also report the results that are obtained from the observed—and
thus tempo-distorted—childbearing intensities.
The investigation of fertility aging in our subsequent analyses is based on the com-
parison of two benchmark scenarios for the pace of fertility postponement during the
life-course of a cohort: (a) a postponement stops scenario in which we calculate the
parity progression measures assuming that the postponement comes to a halt after the ref-
erence year, i.e., assuming that there is no further delay of childbearing after the year for
which the period PPRs are calculated (of speciﬁc importance in this context is the index
of completed fertility in the postponement stops scenario, which is also denoted as period
fertility index); (b) we contrast these calculations with a postponement continues scenario
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in which we assume that the tempo change (and also any changes in the variance of the
fertility schedule) observed in a reference year prevails over the life-course of a cohort.
This postponement continues scenario thus allows us to calculate cohort fertility under the
assumption that a cohort experiences a level of fertility and pace of fertility postponement
that equals the level of fertility and change in the tempo of fertility observed in a reference
year. In this approach we therefore include the postponement of fertility in the notion of
synthetic cohorts: we derive fertility measures that reﬂect the timing, level and distribu-
tion of fertility in hypothetical cohorts that experience the fertility pattern observed in a
given calendar year, where the term ‘fertility pattern’ encompasses the level, tempo and
tempo change in a calendar year.
3 Application to Selected Countries
In the following we apply the above methods to Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain. The
comparison of these countries is particularly useful since they represent very different
fertility patterns that currently prevail in Europe.
3.1 Sweden
Swedish fertility during the 1980s and 1990s has been of great interest to demographers
for its distinct and unusual pattern (Andersson 1999, 2000; Hoem 2000; Hoem and Hoem
1996; Hoem 1990). Whereas fertility levels stagnated or declined in many European
countries during the 1980s, Sweden experienced a baby boom after 1985. Between 1985
and 1990 the TFR increased from 1.74 to a level of 2.13, exceeding replacement level.
In the 1990s this baby boom was displaced by an equally swift baby bust, and by 1999 the
total fertility rate had declined to a historically low level of 1.5 (Council of Europe 2000).
Figure 1 depicts the effect of this baby boom and bust on the total fertility rate for
ﬁrst births. In addition, the ﬁgure also reveals that the changes in fertility since the early
1970s have been accompanied by a rapid postponement of fertility. The mean age at ﬁrst
birth (inferred from age- and order speciﬁc fertility rates), for instance, has increased from
below 24 years to above 28 years over the course of three decades. The only slowdown
during this fertility postponement has apparently occurred during the period of the baby
boom, while the baby bust after 1990 coincides with a renewed increase in the pace of
fertility postponement.
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Figure 1: Sweden: total fertility rate and mean age at birth
years
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(b)  All  parities:  TFR
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The data used for these calculations consists of births by order and age, and person-years
lived by parity and age for each calendar year during the period from 1970 to 1999. These
data have been obtained from Andersson (1999) and Andersson and Guiping (2001), and
they exclude the foreign-born population in Sweden. The estimated TFR levels and
related fertility measures are slightly lower than published ofﬁcial statistics that pertain
to the resident population of Sweden. On the basis of these data we have computed the
parity distribution of the population as well as age- and order speciﬁc fertility rates and
childbearing intensities in each calendar year. (The data are in cohort-period format and
include fertility of birth orders 1, 2, 3, 4+ between ages 15–45).
3.1.2 Changes in the age-pattern of fertility
The changes in the tempo of fertility for ﬁrst and second births are presented in Figure 2.
The mean age of the adjusted intensity schedule increase from about 27 years to above
30 years in the period 1970 to 1999. The extent of tempo distortions caused by this
increase is related to the annual increase in the mean age at birth, which is denoted as r in
the Bongaarts-Feeney notation and as ° in the KO framework. This mean change for ﬁrst
births, i.e., this annual increase in the mean age of the adjusted intensity schedule at parity
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zero, rises from about zero in the early 1970s to about .12 at the beginning of the 1980s.
This mean change declines again to about .05 in 1987, and afterwards the postponement
of ﬁrst births regains its pace and reaches a peak in the late 1990s. In addition, there
is a modest trend towards an increased standard deviation for the intensity schedule of
ﬁrst births. The pace of the annual variance change reverses in the 1990s and becomes
slightly negative towards the end of the observation period. (Formally, the measure of
these variance changes is the relative annual increase in the standard deviation during a
calendar year, and this variance change is denoted as ± in KO and KP.)
The tempo change of second births is less volatile over time as compared to the
changes in the timing of ﬁrst births. The mean age of the adjusted intensity schedule
for second births is relatively stable until 1980 and increases afterwards to over 29 years.
The pace of this increase reaches a peak of .12 in 1985, and it subsequently retards and
stabilizes at a level of .1. It is noteworthy that the pace of fertility postponement for sec-
ond births has been lower than the respective tempo change of ﬁrst births for most years.
The biggest divergences between the changes in the tempo of ﬁrst and second births oc-
cur around 1980 and again towards the end of our observation period. On the other hand,
the tempo change for second births exceeds that of ﬁrst births for a short period in the
late 1980s. Moreover, the variance of the intensity schedule for second births increases
markedly during the period 1970–1999, and these variance changes reach a peak in the
late 1970s and early 1990s; that is, in periods characterized by a decline of the TFR.
The tempo change for third births, which is not shown in Figure 2, is almost zero in
the early 1970s and it increases gradually to about .08 in 1990. It subsequently declines
again and becomes slightly negative in the late 1990s. From the early 1970s onward, the
tempo change of third births is therefore consistently below that of ﬁrst and second births.
The differences between the tempo change and ﬁrst and third birth reach a minimum in
the early 1970s and late 1980s when they almost diminish, and they peak around 1980
and in the late 1990s when the tempo change of ﬁrst births is about .15 higher than that
of third births.
3.1.3 Analysis of fertility patterns using parity-progression measures
The life-time probability in the synthetic cohort of experiencing at least one, two or three
births is depicted in Figure 3(a–c). The calculations are based on adjusted fertility inten-
sities with either no further postponement of fertility (indicated by ‘stops’ in Figure 3)
or a postponement that follows the mean and variance changes observed in the reference
year (indicated by ‘continues’). For comparison we also include the birth probabilities
that are obtained from the observed childbearing intensities (indicated by ‘observed’). In
Figure 3(a) the two postponement scenarios lead to identical results for the life-time birth
probability of at least one child, and the lines therefore overlap.
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Figure 3: Sweden: period lifetime probability of giving birth to at least one, two, or three
children for childless women who are age 15 in the reference year
year





















































Notes: Calculations are based on observed fertility intensities (‘observed’), or on adjusted fertility intensities
with either no further postponement of fertility (‘stops’) or a postponement that follows the mean and variance
changes observed in the reference year (‘continues’)
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The tempo-adjusted period life-time probability of at least one child ﬂuctuates during
1970–1999 in accordance with the overall trend in the total fertility (Figure 3a): an initial
increase is followed by a decline and recovery during the baby boom, and after 1990 the
probability declines again. The changes in this period life-time probability of ﬁrst births,
however, are relatively modest when compared to either changes in the total fertility or
changes in the life-time probabilities for higher birth orders. In particular, there is no
substantial reduction in the period life-time birth probability of at least one child during
the baby bust in the 1990s.
A corresponding calculation of life-time birth probabilities based on observed child-
bearing intensities, i.e., a calculation that ignores potential tempo distortions in child-
bearing intensities, underestimates the probability of having at least one child. This
underestimation in Figure 3(a) is largest in periods with the most rapid delays in en-
tering parenthood during the late 1970s and during the 1990s. As a consequence of this
tempo distortion, the observed intensities erroneously suggest that the period life-time
birth probability of at least one child declines in the late 1990s to its lowest level since
1970.
Similarly, the observed childbearing intensities also lead to an underestimation of the
life-time probability of having at least two children in Figure 3(b). A synthetic cohort
that experiences no further delay in fertility attains a parity of at least two children with
a probability that is up to 7.6 percentage points higher than suggested by the estimates
obtained from the observed intensities. However, the assumption that the synthetic cohort
experiences no further delay in childbearing is quite essential for this increased proba-
bility. In periods when the pace of fertility postponement for ﬁrst births is higher than
the tempo change for second births, i.e., especially around 1980 and to a lesser extent
after 1990, the later age of entering parenthood in the postponement continues scenario
reduces the exposure at the primary ages of giving birth to second children. The aging
of fertility at ﬁrst births that occurs in the postponement continues scenario thus reduces
the probability of having at least two children as compared to the postponement stops
scenario.
In the late 1980s the tempo change for ﬁrst and second births reaches an almost iden-
tical level, and the latter even exceeds the former for a brief period (Figure 2). In this
speciﬁc situation, the postponement continues scenario yields a life-time birth probabil-
ity of at least two children that is slightly above the postponement stops scenario (Figure
3b). This occurs because a later entry into parenthood, which indicates the beginning of
the exposure to second births, does not reduce the probability of progressing to the next
child if the second-birth intensity schedule has been shifted to higher ages at a pace that
perfectly compensates for the delay of ﬁrst births.
The period life-time birth probability of at least three children in Figure 3(c), in-
dependent of its calculation, increases quite substantially during the baby boom and
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subsequently exhibits the most pronounced decline during the baby bust after 1990. The
baby boom and bust in Sweden is therefore primarily associated with changes in the pe-
riod life-time birth probability for second and third children, while the period life-time
birth probabilities for ﬁrst and fourth children ﬂuctuate only modestly during this period.
Since fertility for ﬁrst and second births has been postponed throughout the period
1970–1999, thelife-timebirthprobabilityofathirdchildispotentiallyaffectedbyfertility
aging effects. The extent of the net aging effect is revealed by the postponement continues
scenario, and it leads to a reduction in the probability of having a third child in almost all
periods. Most important is that the reduction due to the net fertility aging effect even
exceeds the bias caused by a neglect of tempo distortions in some periods: the period life-
time birth probability of attaining a parity of at least three in the postponement continues
scenario drops below the probability that is obtained from the observed intensities. This
effect is particularly noteworthy because the observed childbearing intensities are subject
to downward distortions in periods with a delay in childbearing.
Related to the life-time birth probabilities in Figure 3 are the parity progression ra-
tios that reﬂect the probability of having another child. The parity progression ratio from
childlessness to the ﬁrst birth is equal to the life-time probability of having at least one
child and has already been discussed. The period parity progression ratios from ﬁrst
to second, and second to third child are depicted in Figure 4. Similar to our earlier
discussion, the period parity progression ratios calculated from the observed intensities
underestimate the probability of progressing to the next child as compared to the post-
ponement stops scenario. This relation, however, is partially reversed in the postponement
continues scenario.
Consider, for instance, the period progression ratios to the second child in Figure 4(a).
During the period 1971–1984 and from 1990 onwards, the progression ratios in the post-
ponement continues scenario are below the ratios obtained when the postponement of
fertility comes to a halt. In both of these periods, the trend towards later childbearing is
faster for ﬁrst than for second births, and the delay in entering parenthood is thus not com-
pensated by an equally fast postponement of second births. The results for the transitions
from the second to the third birth reﬂect a relatively similar pattern (Figure 4b): the parity
progression ratios that assume a continued postponement are below those that assume no
further postponement, and the difference can again be quite substantial and reach almost
10 percentage points.
The ongoing delay of lower order births therefore implies that women increasingly
start being exposed to second and higher order births when the respective childbearing
intensities are already relatively low. The resulting net fertility aging effect can reduce
parity progression probabilities to an extent that exceeds the tempo distortions incurred
by erroneously using the observed childbearing intensities in the calculations: for all
parity progression ratios in Figure 4 periods exist in which the postponement continues
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Figure 4: Sweden: Period parity progression rates from 1 to 2 and 2 to 3 children for
childless women who are age 15 in the reference year
year



































scenario implies progression ratios that are below the ratios inferred from the observed
data.
The late 1980s are exceptional because during this period the tempo changes for ﬁrst
and second birth are approximately equal. The postponement of the ﬁrst birth is there-
fore accommodated by an equally fast postponement of second births. The life-time birth
probability of at least two children and parity progression ratios to the second child are
therefore approximately equal under both postponement scenarios, or sometimes the re-
sults under the postponement continues scenario even exceed those of the postponement
stops scenario. However, for most of the observation period the pace of fertility post-
ponement is faster at lower than at higher parities. These reductions in the life-time birth
probabilities and parity progression ratios caused in this case by an ongoing fertility post-
ponement can be quite substantial. For instance, the reduction in the parity progression
ratios due to the aging of fertility can be as much as 8 percentage points in Figure 4(a)
and even as much as 10 percentage points in Figure 4(b).
The analyses in Figures 3 and 4 therefore visualize the two pathways of how the
postponement of fertility affects the measurement and assessment of period fertility. On
the one hand, the postponement of fertility distorts the observed childbearing intensities
downward, and only the adjusted childbearing intensities correctly reﬂect the level of
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fertility at each parity. On the other hand, a postponement of fertility that is faster for
lower parities and slower for higher parities implies that women start being exposed to
higher order births at ages when the respective childbearing intensities are already quite
low. The aging of fertility at lower parities, which occurs if the postponement of fertility
continues, therefore reduces the progression to higher order births in synthetic cohorts.
In KO we also compare the inferences obtained from the parity progression mea-
sures proposed in this paper with the corresponding inferences from the adjusted total
fertility rate. Some of the most important differences between a TFR-based and parity-
progression based analysis of the Swedish fertility during 1970–1999 are as follows: (a)
The observed and adjusted TFR suggest an important contribution in terms of a declining
quantum at ﬁrst birth to the overall decline in fertility after 1990. Our parity progression
measures, however, suggest that the baby bust after 1990 is primarily associated with
declining parity progression ratios to the second and third child. (b) In contrast to the
adjusted TFR, our measures reﬂect how the differential tempo changes at different pari-
ties affect the fertility in synthetic cohorts. For most periods, the changes in the tempo of
fertility tend to be faster for lower and slower for higher order births. A continued post-
ponement of fertility in synthetic cohorts therefore tends to reduce the completed fertility
attained in synthetic cohorts due to a net fertility aging effect, and this reduction reaches
its highest levels around 1980 and in the 1990s. (c) The index of total fertility under con-
tinued postponement is only relatively modestly above the observed total fertility during
the baby boom and bust period until about 1995, indicating that the adjusted TFR may
yield an overly optimistic perspective on the fertility level in synthetic cohorts during this
period.
3.1.4 Fertility forecasts for cohorts still in childbearing years
We use the parity progression measures introduced in this paper to project the completed
fertility of cohorts who have not ﬁnished childbearing. In particular, we project the fer-
tility of cohorts who have not ﬁnished childbearing as of 1975 and 1999 on the basis of
the parity-speciﬁc level of fertility and the parity-speciﬁc pace of fertility postponement
that prevailed in these two years. In the ﬁrst case we are able to compare the projected
with actual cohort behavior since additional cohorts have completed their childbearing by
1999. Due to the substantial changes in the level and tempo of fertility during the period
1970–1999 in Sweden, any projection that assumes a constant level and tempo of fertility
subsequent to 1975 can be expected to perform relatively poorly, especially for young
cohorts.
The projections depicted in Figure 5 extrapolate the period-fertility pattern of 1975
onto the future fertility behavior of cohorts who have not completed childbearing in 1975.
The pattern observed in 1975 is characterized by a modestly fast postponement at ﬁrst
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Figure 5: Sweden: projection of fertility behavior for cohorts who have not ﬁnished
childbearing in in 1975 or 1999 based on the parity-speciﬁc level of fertility
and postponement pattern observed in these years
cohort
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Notes: The postponement stops (dashed line) and postponement continues (dashed-dotted line) are based on
the tempo-adjusted fertility intensities and assume either no further delays in childbearing or a further delay in
childbearing that mirrors the 1999 postponement pattern. In Graphs (a,c) the two postponement scenarios lead
to identical results and the respective lines overlap. The projections obtained from the observed childbearing
intensities are indicated by dotted lines
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birth, and a quite slow tempo change at second and higher parities (Figure 2). The period
life-time birth probability of at least one child is relatively high in that year, while the
parity progression ratios to the second and third child are considerably below the values
that actually prevail after 1975 (Figures 3 and 4). We therefore expect that the projected
childlessness in cohorts will remain relatively low, while the projected completed cohort
fertility will decline. Moreover, due to the differential tempo changes at ﬁrst and second
births we also expect a considerable net fertility aging effect.
The projected completed cohort fertility in Figure 5(a,b) reveals the pattern just de-
scribed. Based on the 1975 level and postponement pattern, the proportion of childless
women and the completed fertility is projected to decline in younger cohorts. The corre-
spondence between the projected and actual cohort behavior is relatively high for cohorts
who were already in their late 20s or older in 1975. The differences between the actual pe-
riod fertility trend after 1975, and the projected level and tempo based on the observation
in 1975, however lead to a substantial divergence between projected and actual fertility
behavior in younger cohorts.
The projections in Figure 5 also demonstrate the implications of fertility aging in the
postponement continues scenario. Because of the differential tempo changes at ﬁrst and
higher parities, an ongoing postponement of fertility according to the 1975 postponement
pattern implies a further decline of cohort fertility as compared to the postponement stops
scenario. Because of the increases in the level of fertility during the 1980s, especially at
order two and three, the actual behavior of cohorts who were below ages 25–30 in 1975
differs quite substantially from the projections based on the 1975 level of fertility in both
postponement scenarios.
In Figures 5(c,d) we report the corresponding projections for cohorts who have not
completed childbearing as of 1999. These projections are based on the pace of fertility
postponement and the level of fertility observed in 1999, i.e., the last year for which
data are available. This calendar year is characterized by a quite rapid postponement at
ﬁrst, and to a somewhat lesser extent, second births (Figure 2), and also by period parity
progression ratios to the third and fourth birth that are considerably below the values in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Because of the rapid tempo changes of fertility in the late 1990s, the projections based
on the observed data and the adjusted childbearing intensities differ quite substantially.
In particular, the calculations based on the observed childbearing intensities project an
ultimate level of childlessness that increases to about 23% in young cohorts. However,
becausethepaceoffertilitypostponementwasquitehighduringthe1990sinSweden, this
projection is distorted by tempo effects. The unbiased calculations based on the adjusted
childbearing intensities with no further postponement of fertility project a substantially
lower level that levels off at about 15% in young cohorts.
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Figure 6: The Netherlands: total fertility rate and mean age at birth
years
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Figure 6 depicts the total fertility rate for ﬁrst births and for all parities for the period
1977–1998. The striking aspect of this fertility development, which contrasts with devel-
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opments in both Sweden and Spain, is the relative constant level of the total fertility in this
period (Beets 1993; van Imhoff 2001). The overall fertility rate ﬂuctuates modestly be-
tween 1.46 and 1.62, with a slightly upward tendency towards the end of the period. The
same pattern is also evident for ﬁrst births. The total fertility rate for ﬁrst births ﬂuctuates
between .63 and .78 in the 1980s and 1990s, and exhibits a modest upward trend from
the early 1980s onwards. Throughout this period there is a clear trend towards postponed
childbearing, and the mean age at ﬁrst birth (calculated from the age-speciﬁc fertility rates
for ﬁrst births) increases from about 26 years in the late 1970s to above 29 years in the
late 1990s.
3.2.1 Data
Parity-speciﬁc occurrence-exposure rates and parity-distributions for the cohorts born af-
ter 1935–83 for the Netherlands have been made available to us by Evert van Imhoff.
Since direct information on the population by parity has only recently become available,
the parity distribution is reconstructed from the above age- and order-speciﬁc birth rates
for the above cohorts. The veriﬁcation of this reconstruction with the observed parity
distribution for January 1st, 2000 conﬁrms that the reconstruction is of high quality with
only minor differences between the reconstructed and observed parity distribution of the
population. Our calculations are based on age- and order speciﬁc fertility rates and child-
bearing intensities that are obtained from these cohort data. In particular, our analyses for
birth orders 1, 2, 3, and 4+ encompass the period 1977–1998 and the age range 15–45
years (for other analyses with these data, see van Imhoff 2001; van Imhoff and Keilman
2000).
3.2.2 Changes in the age-pattern of fertility
We begin our analysis of fertility trends in the Netherlands with the mean age and variance
changes in the intensity schedules for ﬁrst and second births during the period 1977–1998
(Figure 7). The general delay in childbearing in the Netherlands during this period is
clearly reﬂected in these moments of the intensity schedule. For ﬁrst births, the mean
age of the intensity schedule increases from about 28.5 years to almost 31.5 years. This
increase in the mean age is also accompanied by changes in the standard deviation of
the intensity schedule. In particular, an initial increase from about 4.54 to 4.75 has been
followed by a stabilization and a slight decline in recent years. For second births, the
pattern is quite similar: the mean age of the intensity schedule increases substantially
from about 27.5 years in the late 1970s to 29.7 years in the late 1990s, and this process
coincideswitharelativelylargeincreaseinthestandarddeviationoftheintensityschedule
from about 4.9 to 5.6.
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Although a postponement of childbearing prevails throughout the period, the pace
of this postponement varies quite substantially. The annual mean change for ﬁrst births
increases from about .07 in the late 1970s to above .21 in 1985, and it then declines
again to below .1 towards the late 1990s. The same inverted U-shape also occurs at
order two, where the pace of postponement initially increases towards a peak in the late
1980s, and then declines. This relatively strong synchronization between these tempo
changes between birth-order one and two is remarkable. With only a few years delay, the
tempo change at second birth follows the increased pace of fertility postponement for ﬁrst
births, and similarly, it declines again as the postponement at birth-order one loses some
of its momentum in the 1990s. This synchronization will have important implications
for fertility aging. In particular, we do not expect a large net fertility aging effect for the
periods after 1990 when the tempo-changes for ﬁrst and second births are almost equal.
In addition to these mean changes, the postponement of fertility in the Netherlands
is also characterized by some noteworthy variance changes for ﬁrst and second births.
Initially, the standard deviation of the intensity schedule for ﬁrst births increases and
the pace of this increase reaches a peak around 1988. Afterwards, the pace towards an
increased variance declines, and the trend even reverses for ﬁrst births in the late 1990s.
As in the Swedish case, this pattern may indicate that we are seeing a ﬁrst sign of a
concentration of ﬁrst births into a narrowing age interval.
3.2.3 Analysis of fertility patterns using parity-progression measures
InFigure8weshowtheperiodlifetimebirthprobabilitiesthatareassociatedwiththelevel
and postponement of fertility observed during 1977–1998. Since there is a trend towards
later ages at childbearing throughout this period, the calculations based on the observed
rates tend to underestimate the lifetime birth probabilities. In particular, our calculations
suggest that throughout the 1980s the lifetime birth probability for ﬁrst births ﬂuctuated
very modestly between .8 and .85, despite the fact that the observed total fertility rate at
order one during this period was only between .63 and .7. Moreover, the slight decline
that occurs in the early 1980s in the probabilities calculated from the observed rates seems
to be entirely due to the increasing pace of fertility postponement during these years. This
difference between the birth probabilities calculated with and without tempo adjustment,
which is due to tempo-distortions, vanishes in the 1990s as a result of the declining pace
of postponement for ﬁrst births.
A relatively similar pattern occurs at birth-order two. The calculations based on the
observed rates reveal a decline in the probability of a second child from .61 to about .52
in the late 1970s and early 1980s and afterwards a modest increase towards .6. In the
postponement stops scenario, i.e., when it is assumed that the postponement stops after
the year for which the calculations are performed, the lifetime birth probability actually
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Figure 8: The Netherlands: period lifetime probability of giving birth to at least one, two,
or three children for childless women who are age 15 in the reference year
year
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Figure 9: The Netherlands: Period parity progression rates from 1 to 2 and 2 to 3 children
for childless women who are age 15 in the reference year
year



































increases because the observed rates are increasingly distorted by the increasing pace of
fertility postponement. In the 1990s, as postponement becomes slower, this trend re-
verses and the period probability of giving birth declines and converges with the period
probability obtained from the observed rates.
Since the postponement of fertility continued through 1977–1998, the calculations
under the postponement continues scenario may be more relevant in order to assess the
cohort fertility that is associated with these period patterns. The analyses in Figure 8
indicate that a continued postponement leads to a net fertility aging effect that reduces the
lifetime birth probability of a second child up to the mid 1980s. The size of this effect
diminishes and after 1985 this pattern even reverses: a continued postponement actually
facilitates a higher likelihood of a second birth since the pace of postponement is faster
for second than for ﬁrst births. This situation, which is similar to that in Sweden in the late
1980s, is temporary: in the late 1990s the life-time birth probabilities for second births in
the two postponement scenarios converge due to the declining difference in the delay of
childbearing for ﬁrst and second births. The pattern for third births is relatively similar.
In Figure 9 we re-express the above developments in terms of period parity pro-
gression ratios. If the calculations are based on the observed rates, the period parity
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progression ratio is almost constant at about .7–.75 throughout the period 1977-98. Once
tempo-distortions are removed in the postponement stops scenario, we see that the parity
progression probability actually increases until the mid 1980s. It subsequently declines
to values slightly below its peak in the late 1980s.
The most relevant comparison is again with the parity progression ratios in the post-
ponement continues scenario. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the delay of
childbearing occurred for ﬁrst but not yet for second births, a continuation of this post-
ponement pattern leads to a substantial net fertility aging effect that reduced the period
parity progression probability as compared to the postponement stops scenario; moreover,
this PPR even drops below the level estimated from the observed rates. Towards the late
1980s, this pattern reverses. A rapid postponement of fertility also occurs at order two,
which reduced and then eliminated the net fertility aging effect in the late 1980s.
During the 1990s the parity progression ratio from the ﬁrst to the second child de-
clines more pronouncedly in the postponement continues scenario as compared to the
postponement stops scenario, leading to a convergence in the late 1990s. The relatively
low pace and high synchronization of postponement in the late 1990s also implies that
there is virtually no net fertility aging effect.
The pattern for the progression to third births in Figure 9 reveals a modest net fertility
aging effect that slightly declines until the late 1980s, then reemerges for a short period
and then vanishes again towards the late 1990s.
3.2.4 Comparison with the adjusted TFR
In the following we compare the inferences based on parity-progression based measures
of fertility with those of the adjusted total fertility rate. In Figure 10 we clearly see that the
lifetime birth probability after removing tempo distortions and the adjusted TFR suggest
a substantially higher level of fertility for ﬁrst births than the observed total fertility rate
at order one. The lifetime birth probability also ﬂuctuates substantially less than the
adjusted TFR. Moreover, there is a striking divergence in the fertility trend during the
1990s based on the different measures. In particular, the lifetime birth probabilities in
Figure 10(a) suggest a relatively stable level of fertility for ﬁrst births during the 1990s,
while the total fertility rate and the adjusted TFR at order one suggest an increase towards
the late 1990s.
Figure 10(b) combines all parities and compares the standard and adjusted total fer-
tility rate, the period fertility index and the index of total fertility in the postponement
continues scenario. In almost all years, the observed TFR yields the lowest indicator of
fertility. All measures that remove tempo distortions indicate that the level of fertility
during the last two decades in the Netherlands exceeded the observed TFR, although
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Figure 10: The Netherlands: Left graph: comparison of total fertility rate, adjusted TFR
and period lifetime birth probability for ﬁrst births. Right graph: comparison
of total fertility rate, adjusted TFR (all birth orders), period fertility index
and the index of total fertility in the postponement continues scenario
years
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noteworthy differences exist in the extent of tempo distortions that are suggested by the
various measures.
In particular, the adjusted TFR yields the highest fertility measure. It is then followed
by the period fertility index, which assumes—similar to the adjusted TFR when inter-
preted as a cohort measure—that the delay of childbearing comes to a halt after the year
for which the calculations are performed. If this is not the case and the postponement
continues, net fertility aging effects can further reduce the level of fertility. The extent
of this reduction is revealed by the index of total fertility in the postponement continues
scenario.
The Netherlands, however, are remarkable with respect to the irrelevance of fertility
aging during the last 10–15 years. The pace of fertility postponement was highly syn-
chronized across parities, and the delay of ﬁrst births has been compensated by an almost
equal delay of second and third births. This synchronization is partially facilitated by the
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fact that the recent mean changes for ﬁrst births have been relatively modest and implied
an annual increase in the intensity schedule mean age of about .1, which is considerably
below the peak of .21 in the early 1980s. This pace of postponement is also below the
most recent values observed in Sweden and Spain during the 1990s, where the delay of
childbearing implies an annual mean change of above .2.
In summary, the story suggested by these indexes about Dutch fertility during the last
thirty years consists of a muted increase during the ﬁrst part of the 1980’s that occurred
simultaneously with a delay in childbearing. The result was an apparently stable TFR.
These trends reversed during the 1990’s. Fertility has gone back to levels comparable to
those at the beginning of the period, while the postponement of fertility continued, albeit
at a somewhat slower pace (see also Lesthaeghe 2001).
3.2.5 Fertility forecasts for cohorts still in childbearing years
In Figure 11 we use the above fertility measure to project the fertility of cohorts who have
not completed childbearing as of 1983 or 1998. The ﬁrst of these years belongs to the
period in the Netherlands, during which the postponement of fertility was most rapid and
the total fertility reached its lowest level during the period 1977–1998. If the observed
childbearing intensities in 1983 are used to project the cohort fertility after this year, the
projection suggests a rapidly increasing levelof childlessness that reached about 25%, and
it also suggests a rapidly declining level of cohort fertility until the 1960 cohort, where
fertility stabilizes at a level of 1.45.
When the projection based on the observed rates in 1983 is compared with the ac-
tual development, it becomes apparent that the rapid increase in childlessness and the
rapid decline in cohort fertility has not occurred in the cohorts who had not completed
childbearing as of 1983. Moreover, after removing tempo distortions, the lifetime birth
probability inferred from the 1983 period fertility pattern provides a very good projection
of the actual level of childlessness in cohorts born until the late 1960s, where the latter
is quite reliably estimated in graph (d) in the lower panel of the ﬁgure. Furthermore,
projections of the completed cohort fertility based on the postponement stops and post-
ponement continues scenario in 1983 provide a substantially better indicator of the actual
development than the projections based on the observed pattern. At the same time, these
projections based on the 1983 period pattern constitute an underestimate of the actual de-
velopment, which is due to the increases in the lifetime birth probabilities for second and
third births after that calendar year.
In the late 1990s, the postponement of fertility had lost some of its momentum in the
Netherlands, and the projections based on 1998 yield relatively similar results indepen-
dent of whether they are based on the observed childbearing intensities or alternatively
on the postponement stops and postponement continues scenario. In particular, based on
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Figure 11: The Netherlands: projection of fertility behavior for cohorts who have not
ﬁnished childbearing in in 1975 or 1999 based on the parity-speciﬁc level of
fertility and postponement pattern observed in these years
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Notes: The postponement stops (dashed line) and postponement continues (dashed-dotted line) are based on
the tempo-adjusted fertility intensities and assume either no further delays in childbearing or a further delay in
childbearing that mirrors the 1999 postponement pattern. In Graphs (a,c) the two postponement scenarios lead
to identical results and the respective lines overlap. The projections obtained from the observed childbearing
intensities are indicated by dotted lines
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Figure 12: Spain: total fertility rate and mean age at birth
years
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The Spanish fertility trend during the 1980s and 1990s provides an appealing contrast
to those observed in Sweden or the Netherlands. Whereas Sweden is characterized by
a baby boom and subsequent baby bust, and the Netherlands surprises the observer by
its relative constant pattern, the Spanish case is typical for the experience of Southern
European countries.
Between 1977 and 1998 the total fertility rate for ﬁrst births declined from above .95
to below .6, and the total fertility rate for all parities dropped from above 2.5 to below
1.2 (Figure 12). This process was accompanied by a rapid delay of entering parenthood,
and the mean age at ﬁrst birth (calculated from age-speciﬁc fertility rates at order one)
has increased in merely two decades from below 25 years to almost 29 years. This rapid
increase raises the important question about the extent to which the apparent fertility
declineinSpainis‘merely’aconsequenceofthefertilitypostponementandtheassociated
tempo distortions (see also Kohler et al. 2001 a; Ortega-Osona and Kohler 2002).
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3.3.1 Data
Vital registration in Spain provides age-, order and cohort-speciﬁc information on births
since 1975. The parity distribution of women has not previously been reconstructed and is
subject to a substantial lack of information since the census provides tabulations only for
ﬁve-year age groups. For those cohorts where the complete fertility path is available, we
have used the fertility rates to reconstruct cohort parity distributions. For the remaining
cohorts we have used a mixture of an imputed parity distribution based on fertility at the
beginning of the period, and the observed parity distribution in 1991 which has kindly
been provided to us by Namkee Ahn, as tabulated from the large 1991 Sociodemographic
survey (sample over 100,000). We are quite conﬁdent that the reconstruction of the parity
distribution of the population is accurate in relatively recent years, while some uncertainty
exists in the construction of the parity distribution, especially at higher parities, in early
years. On the basis of this information about births and the reconstructed parity distribu-
tion of the population, we have computed age- and parity-speciﬁc fertility rates and age-
and parity-speciﬁc childbearing intensities for the period 1977–1998 (birth orders 1, 2, 3,
and 4+ arranged in age-period format).
3.3.2 Changes in the age-pattern of fertility
In Figure 13 we show the changing age-pattern of Spanish fertility from 1977 to 1998
using the mean age and standard deviation of the intensity schedule at order one and
two. For ﬁrst birth, the intensity-schedule mean age increases from below 26 years to
almost 31, and this increase coincides with a substantial decline in the standard deviation
from about 5.4 to about 4.7. For second births, there is a modest increase in the intensity
schedule mean age in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which is then followed by a decline
and a renewed—but relatively modest—increase. Moreover, there is also a slight increase
in the standard deviation of the intensity schedule for second births prior to 1985, which
is followed by a decline and renewed increase.
Striking differences exist between birth orders one and two with respect to the pace of
fertility postponement over time. The decline of fertility in the early 1980s is associated
with a rapid increase in the pace of fertility postponement for ﬁrst births. The annual
mean change increases from zero to above .3 in merely 13 years. This rapid pace did not
lose much of its momentum by the late 1990s, despite the fact that this sustained pace of
fertility postponement for ﬁrst births is quite high when compared to other countries. This
intense postponement of ﬁrst births is in contrast to the ﬂuctuating mean age at second
birth. We should therefore expect a very large net fertility aging effect during the 1980s
and early 1990s. In most recent years an increasing delay of second births has emerged,
and the pace of this postponement at order two is approaching the pace for ﬁrst births. In
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thelate1990s, wewillthusnotexpectastrongnetfertilityagingeffectduetoadifferential
pace of fertility postponement at order one and two.
It is also interesting to observe that the rapid postponement of ﬁrst births in the last
decade has been associated with a decline in the standard deviation of the intensity sched-
ule. This pattern suggests that there has been a different pace of fertility postponement
at different ages: in particular, this declining variance suggests that the pace of fertility
postponement was more rapid at early ages and more modest at higher ages. This fact,
which we will elaborate more in our ﬁnal discussion, may suggest that the postponement
of fertility at high ages may reach limits, and that women who are still childless at rela-
tively high ages do not postpone their births at the same pace as women at young ages.
This decline in the standard deviation of the intensity schedule is a ﬁrst sign of a con-
centration of ﬁrst-births in an increasingly narrow age-interval. For second births, this
concentration of childbearing intensities is not yet present, and the intensity schedule at
order two gradually increases its variance throughout the period. [Note 3]
In the late 1990s the postponement is clearly most pronounced for ﬁrst and second
births. There has been no substantial increase in the mean age of the intensity schedule at
order three during the period 1977–1998, and the mean age even declined until the mid
1980s. A modest postponement of third births, exhibiting an annual mean change of up
to .05, only emerges towards the late 1990s.
In summary, these patterns of mean- and variance changes at parities one and two
suggest quite relevant tempo distortions in the measurement of fertility, especially at ﬁrst
and second births. Moreover, we expect quite different net fertility aging effects over
time: on the one hand, between 1985–1990 the postponement of fertility has primarily
affected ﬁrst births and not yet second births, and if this pattern prevailed over time, then
the probability of higher order births would decline substantially due to an increasing
age at ﬁrst birth that is not accommodated by a postponement of second births. On the
other hand, the postponement at second births rapidly increases its pace towards the late
1990s, and in most recent years the net fertility aging effect is likely to diminish in overall
relevance.
3.3.3 Analysis of fertility patterns using parity-progression measures
Figure 14 depicts the period life-time birth probabilities for birth orders one, two and
three. In accordance with the trend in the observed total fertility rate for ﬁrst births, the
lifetime birth probability for ﬁrst children based on the observed rates declines from about
.85 to .75. This decline is somewhat less than the decline in the TFR for order one. In
addition, tempo effects are veryimportant, as can be expectedgiven the fastpostponement
of childbearing in Spain during the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, after adjusting for
tempo distortions, the lifetime birth probabilities for order one remain remarkably stable
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Figure 14: Spain: period lifetime probability of giving birth to at least one, two, or three
children for childless women who are age 15 in the reference year
year
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between .85 and .9 (Figure 14a). There is some decline in these birth probabilities in the
1990s, but this decline is very modest when compared to the total fertility rate at order
one. The calculation therefore suggests that the rapidly increasing tempo change at order
one in the early 1980s, and the continuously rapid pace of fertility postponement since
the mid-1980s accounts for a substantial part for the decline in ﬁrst birth rates in Spain.
As we will see in our projections, this ﬁnding implies that the extent of childlessness does
not substantially increase in younger cohorts unless the quantum of fertility at order one
declines in the future.
The lifetime probabilities of experiencing a second or third birth differ substantially
from that of ﬁrst births. In both cases, the lifetime birth probability—independent of
whether it is calculated from the observed rates or adjusted for tempo distortions—has
declined substantially in the last two decades. Particularly interesting is the comparison
of the postponement stops and postponement continues scenario at order two. The birth
probability in the former scenario, which represents the likelihood of having a second
child if the postponement of fertility comes to a halt in the reference year, declines from
about .8 to .6 during the period 1977–1998. A strikingly different pattern emerges in
the postponement continues scenario. In this case, the lifetime probability drops rapidly
from about .83 to below .4 in 1990, and during the 1990s increases again to about .55.
This increase in the lifetime birth probability in the postponement continues scenario is
primarily due to the increased pace of fertility postponement at order two that starts to
accommodate the postponement at order one. Therefore, a further continuation of the
fertility postponement as observed in the late 1990s is unlikely to substantially reduce
the number of second births due to net fertility aging effects. This is in contrast to the
postponement pattern that prevailed one decade earlier: in the late 1980s the delay of
childbearing had primarily affected ﬁrst births, and a continuation of this unbalanced
pattern would have implied substantial reductions of higher-order births due to fertility
aging.
The analysis in Figure 14(a,b) suggests that the decline in fertility for ﬁrst and sec-
ond births is importantly related to the postponement of fertility. Conventional fertility
measures that do not adjust for tempo-distortions, such as the total fertility rate, therefore
exaggerate the decline in lifetime birth probabilities. For third births, however, the anal-
yses in Figure 14(c) clearly show a substantial decline in the lifetime birth probabilities
in the last two decades. This conﬁrms the conclusion that the most salient and robust
characteristic of Spanish fertility decline is the sharp reduction in the probability of three
or more births.
The different trends in parity-speciﬁc fertility are reemphasized by the parity progres-
sion rates in Figure 15. In the late 1970s the period parity progression rates suggest that
almost all women who had a ﬁrst child progressed to the second child, and that about half
of the women who had two children progressed to the third child. Both parity progression
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Figure 15: Spain: Period parity progression rates from 1 to 2 and 2 to 3 children for
childless women who are age 15 in the reference year
year















































probabilities have substantially declined in the last two decades, although some of this
decline is exaggerated by tempo distortions.
The most striking case is again the postponement continues scenario for progression
to parity two. In the 1980s, the fertility behavior for second births has not yet adjusted
to the rapid postponement of ﬁrst births, in part because the women who were at risk
of giving births to their second child had their ﬁrst children prior to the onset of a rapid
fertility postponement. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, this pattern started to change,
and the postponement of ﬁrst births lead to a rapid postponement of second births that
increasingly compensates for the delay at birth-order one. The lifetime probability of giv-
ing birth to a second child therefore increases quite substantially towards the late 1990s.
This increase is due to two factors: on the one hand, there has been a slight increase in
the lifetime birth probability of a second child even in the postponement stops scenario,
indicating a slightly increased level of fertility at order two. On the other hand, the most
important determinant of the increased probability of a second child in the postponement
continues scenario is the increased pace of fertility postponement at order two that ac-
commodates part of the postponement that has occurred in earlier years at order one. This
pattern of accommodation has not yet occurred—and is, in our opinion, also unlikely
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Figure 16: Spain: Left graph: comparison of total fertility rate, adjusted TFR and period
lifetime birth probability for ﬁrst births. Right graph: comparison of total
fertility rate, adjusted TFR (all birth orders), period fertility index and the
index of total fertility in the postponement continues scenario
years
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to occur—at order three, and all of our calculations suggest a substantial decline in the
probability of progressing from the second to the third child.
3.3.4 Comparison with the adjusted TFR
In Figure 16 we compare the inferences about the fertility decline in Spain using our par-
ity progression measures with the corresponding analyses using the adjusted total fertility
rate. Similar to our earlier analyses, Figure 16(a) reveals that the adjusted TFR at order
one can be a quite noisy and volatile measure that in part overestimates the period prob-
abilities of having a ﬁrst birth. While differences exist in detail, the period lifetime birth
probability at order one and the adjusted TFR for ﬁrst births suggest that a substantial part
of the decline in birth rates is due to the rapid pace of fertility postponement that emerged
in the 1980s and persisted throughout the 1990s.
http://www.demographic-research.org/ 179Demographic Research - Volume 6, Article 7
Thisgeneralconclusionisalsoconﬁrmedwhenallparitiesarecombined(Figure16b).
Both the adjusted TFR and the period fertility index, which is based on the postponement
stops scenario, decline substantially less during the period 1977–1998 than the observed
total fertility rate. In particular, the postponement stops scenario suggests that if the delay
of childbearing had stopped immediately after any year from 1990 onwards, long-term
cohort fertility would have stabilized at approximately 1.6–1.8 children.
It is again interesting to compare the postponement stops and postponement contin-
ues scenario. In the early phases of the fertility decline, the postponement has primarily
affected ﬁrst births and not yet higher order births. As a consequence of this, a continu-
ation of the delay in childbearing implies a substantial net fertility aging effect which is
revealed in the divergence between the period fertility index and the index of completed
fertility in the postponement continues scenarios. In particular, in the ﬁrst phase of the
fertility decline the index of completed fertility in the postponement continues scenario
follows the observed total fertility rate quite closely. This indicates that cohorts having
their ﬁrst birth during those years might not have a second child because of the relatively
late age at which the ﬁrst birth occurred.
This pattern reemphasizes the lack of adjustment of fertility behavior at higher parities
to the postponement of childbearing at ﬁrst birth. In part, this is due to the fact that the
women exposed to second births in the early 1980s had themselves not yet postponed the
entry into parenthood. In part, this pattern may also be due to a socioeconomic context of
childbearing that had not yet adjusted to a delayed entry into parenthood. By the end of
the 1990s, apparently, some important changes had occurred. The fertility postponement
started to shift the intensity schedule at order two towards higher ages and this leds to a
rise in the index of completed fertility in the postponement continues scenario because
the delay of ﬁrst births was accommodated by an according delay of second births.
3.3.5 Fertility forecasts for cohorts still in childbearing years
As in our application to Sweden and the Netherlands, we conclude our discussion of
the Spanish fertility trends with a projection of cohort fertility of cohorts who have not
completed childbearing. We choose the year 1998, which is the last year for which data
are available, as the starting point of our projection. As earlier, the projections assume a
constant level of fertility at all parities, and they either assume a continuation or halt of
the fertility postponement after the reference year. For comparison we also include the
projections based on the observed childbearing intensities.
Figures 17(a,b) depict the level of childlessness and completed fertility that result
from these projections based on the 1998 fertility pattern. Based on the observed rates,
the projections suggest that childlessness stabilizes at quite high proportions over 25%
in young cohorts. If we account for the tempo-distortions in the 1998 period fertility
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Figure 17: Spain: projection of fertility behavior for cohorts who have not ﬁnished
childbearing in 1998 based on the parity-speciﬁc level of fertility and post-
ponement pattern observed in this year
cohort
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Notes: The postponement stops (dashed line) and postponement continues (dashed-dotted line) are based on
the tempo-adjusted fertility intensities and assume either no further delays in childbearing or a further delay in
childbearing that mirrors the 1999 postponement pattern. In Graphs (a) the two postponement scenarios lead
to identical results and the respective lines overlap. The projections obtained from the observed childbearing
intensities are indicated by dotted lines
pattern, the projected childlessness is much lower. In particular, only between 15–20% of
women who are still in childbearing years are expected to have no children based on our
calculations, and childlessness peaks for cohorts born in the mid-1960s.
A similar pattern of distortions also occurs in the projections of completed fertility.
An extrapolation of the observed childbearing intensities projects a decline of cohort fer-
tility to 1.3 children for women born after the early 1970s. This projection, however,
is affected by the quite substantial tempo-distortions in the 1998 period fertility pattern.
The postponement stops scenario, which eliminates these distortions and assumes a halt
of the fertility postponement, yields a considerably higher assessment of the fertility level
in young cohorts, and completed fertility is projected to level off at around 1.6 children.
Moreover, the trend in cohort fertility is subject to a reversal after it reaches a trough of
1.5 for cohorts in born in the late 1960s.
This reversal and increase of cohort fertility to levels above 1.6, however, depends
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critically on the future pattern of postponement. In the postponement continues scenario,
cohort fertility stabilizes at a level around 1.5, and the difference in this scenario as com-
pared to the postponement stops scenario is due to the effects of fertility aging. This effect
is not very strong in comparison to the Swedish case, but it nevertheless affects long-term
cohort fertility in a noticeable fashion.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we analyze the fertility patterns in Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain during
the last twenty-ﬁve years. In these concluding remarks we concentrate on the important
commonalities and divergences between these countries, and the reader is referred to the
country-speciﬁc sections for the discussion of the speciﬁc developments and trends.
In all three countries the fertility pattern in recent years has been characterized by a—
sometimes quite rapid—postponement of childbearing towards higher ages. Despite this
common feature, these countries exhibit strikingly different trends in the level of fertility
over time. In fact, these countries are to some extent representative for three different
fertility regimes across Europe. Sweden experienced a swift baby boom and baby bust
in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, while fertility rates in the 1990s are declining, they
are still relatively high in an European comparison. The Netherlands is characterized by
an apparent stability of the level of fertility at a moderately high level, while the Spanish
development is typical for the rapid decline towards lowest-low levels of fertility in the
Mediterranean countries.
The analyses of the fertility development in Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain with
the tempo-adjusted period parity progression measures introduced in Kohler et al. (2001
a) suggest the following main conclusions about the emergence—or non-emergence—of
low and lowest-low fertility in these countries:
² Tempo distortions are an important aspect in understanding the fertility pattern in
the last 25 years in Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain. This rapid increase in the
postponement of childbearing implies that the observed period fertility measures
exaggerate the declines in fertility unless they are adjusted for tempo-distortions.
² In many cases, the assessment of the fertility pattern through adjusted period fer-
tility measures that remove tempo distortions differs substantially from the pattern
revealed by the total fertility rate, both on the level of individual birth orders as well
as for the combined analysis of all parities.
² At the same time, a pure removal of tempo distortions is not sufﬁcient to assess
synthetic cohort fertility that is associated with the fertility pattern—including the
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level, tempo and tempo change—observed in a given calendar year. The second
important aspect is the net fertility aging effect that reveals the dynamic implica-
tions of a fertility postponement in a cohort perspective. In particular, while the
adjusted total fertility rate (Bongaarts and Feeney 1998) correctly suggests that
tempo-distortions explain a substantial part of the fertility decline in recent years,
this adjusted TFR also suggests a long-term cohort fertility level that is too high
as compared to our projections and analyses which are based on period parity pro-
gression measures. The reason for this overestimation of cohort fertility through
the adjusted TFR is twofold: ﬁrst, the adjusted TFR does not account for the net
fertility aging effects and the reduction of higher order births that occurs if the post-
ponement of fertility prevails in the future. Second, the inference about the change
in the tempo of fertility from the schedule of age-speciﬁc fertility rates is likely to
be exaggerated because these rates are affected by changes in the parity distribution
of the population (for a further discussion, see Kohler and Ortega 2002; Ortega and
Kohler 2002 a).
² In the most recent years, the increase in the mean age at ﬁrst birth is frequently
associated with a decline in the standard-deviation of the age-pattern of childbear-
ing intensities at order one. This change in the standard deviation of the intensity
schedule occurs due to a differential pace of fertility postponement at different ages
(for an extended discussion, see KP), and in particular, it suggests that the pace of
fertility postponement is faster among women at relatively young ages than among
women who are still childless at relatively old ages. The decline in the standard de-
viation of the intensity schedule can therefore be interpreted as a ﬁrst indication of
a concentration of ﬁrst-births in an increasingly narrow age-interval, and we believe
that this trend is likely to become even more pronounced in the future.
² This prediction has immediate implications for limits to the postponement of fertil-
ity in the future. Our analyses already reﬂect a trade-off between increases in the
mean-age of the intensity schedule on one side, and the persistence of a dispersed
age-pattern of childbearing intensities on the other side. In all three countries, the
most recent increase in the intensity schedule mean age at ﬁrst birth has been as-
sociated with a decline in the variance. While the postponement of fertility can
probably continue for a considerable time in the future, it is unlikely to do so at a
constant dispersion of the risk of entering parenthood. In the future, we believe that
further postponements will lead to a concentration of ﬁrst-childbearing that results
from a more rapid postponement at younger ages and a more modest or even ab-
sent postponement of fertility at higher ages. Two reasons may potentially underlie
this divergence. First, medical progress or social changes that facilitate ‘very old’
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ﬁrst-birth childbearing may not have been quick enough in facilitating a rapid post-
ponement of fertility at already advanced childbearing ages. Second, women who
are still childless at relatively advanced ages face signiﬁcantly different incentives
regarding a further delay of childbearing than women at ages 20–30 when the en-
try into parenthood competes with increasingly strong demands or incentives for
higher education, female labor force participation, or desires for individualism, etc.
In our opinion, this second factor emphasizing the differential incentives for a delay
in the entry of parenthood is likely to be more important than the potential medi-
cal or social ‘limits’ to a further delay of childbearing (for a detailed theoretical
and empirical model of ﬁrst-birth timing and completed fertility, see for instance
Kohler et al. 2001 b).
² The changes in the timing of fertility over time and across parities are system-
atic and follow a roughly common path in all three countries. The postponement
of fertility usually starts and is most pronounced at the ﬁrst birth, and the delay
of entering parenthood is the most important component in the overall delay of
childbearing. However, in all countries analyzed in this paper we observe a syn-
chronization between the delay in ﬁrst and second births. In particular, the tempo
change at second births frequently increases (or decreases) a few years after the cor-
responding change in the postponement of ﬁrst births. This synchronization in the
fertility postponement at ﬁrst and second birth is an important aspect in evaluating
the fertility implications of delayed childbearing because it suggests that fertility
behavior and many of its social and economic determinants gradually adjust to a
delayed age at ﬁrst birth. These socioeconomic and demographic changes thus ac-
commodate the delay of entering parenthood and they prevent or limit a decline
in the progression to the second child for women who have postponed their ﬁrst
child. This pattern is consistent with recent micro-evidence that the age at ﬁrst
birth in younger cohorts is losing its—traditionally very strong—negative associa-
tion with completed fertility (Kohler et al. 2001 b; Morgan and Rindfuss 1999). On
the aggregate level, this implies that the net fertility aging effect caused by an on-
going postponement of fertility tends to be reduced in more recent years, although
it remains relevant for third and higher-order births.
² Contrary to calculations that do not remove tempo-distortions from the observed
fertility pattern, our analyses do not suggest substantial increases in childlessness
in cohorts who have not completed childbearing as of the late 1990s. In particular,
our analyses suggest childlessness in these cohorts would stabilize between 15–
20% in these countries if the future level of fertility at order one mirrors the level of
fertility observed during the 1990s. The substantial increases in childlessness that
are inferred from the observed fertility rates or childbearing intensities at order one
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seem to be due to tempo-distortions that result from the rapid increase or persis-
tent rapid pace of fertility postponement at order one. Moreover, variations in the
lifetime probability of at least one child do not seem to be a strong determinant of
the changing fertility levels in Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain. A considerable
part of the variations in observed ﬁrst-birth rates therefore seems to be related to
the varying pace of delaying parenthood over time.
² The progression to the second child is emerging as a key determinant of fertility
levels in younger cohorts. During the 1980s and 1990s, all countries in our study
exhibit quite substantial changes in the lifetime probability of giving birth to at
least two children. In part these ﬂuctuations are due to a varying level of fertility
at order two. For instance, in Sweden this level increased and decreased during the
baby boom and bust, and in Spain it declined considerably during the 1980s. Of at
least similar relevance, however, is the presence or absence of a synchronization in
the postponement of fertility between birth-orders one and two. In particular, the
long-term persistence of a situation where ﬁrst, but not second births are rapidly
postponed leads to a substantial reduction in the probability of progressing to the
second child, and an essential question regarding long-term cohort fertility is the
accommodation of a delayed entry into parenthood through a equivalent delay of
fertility at order two. In all three countries such an accommodation emerges in the
late 1980s or during the 1990s, and it seems to be most striking in the Spanish case.
² ThemostsalientaspectofthefertilitydeclineinSwedenandSpainisthesubstantial
reduction in the lifetime birth probabilities of a third and fourth child. The reasons
for this decline are twofold. First, there has been a substantial reduction in the level
of childbearing intensities at these higher parities in the 1980s and 1990s. Second,
this decline is partially due to the presence of a strong net fertility aging effect at
higher parities. While part of the postponement of ﬁrst births is accommodated by
a delay in second births, we have not identiﬁed a similar development at third or
fourth births. The increasing delay of entering parenthood and progressing to the
third child therefore leads to a reduction of higher order births not only because the
respective level is reduced, but because the exposure to these births is increasingly
shifted towards ages with very low probabilities of progressing to the third or forth
child.
In summary, the analyses in this paper provide a somewhat more optimistic perspective
on low and lowest-low fertility than some other comparable studies. In particular, our
analyses suggest that there will not be substantial increases in childlessness in younger
cohorts, and that cohort fertility in Sweden, the Netherlands and Spain is likely to stabilize
at a level above 1.5 if the fertility patterns of the late 1990s prevail in the future.
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It is important to emphasize here the caveats and conditions that are associated with
these projections and assessments of long-term fertility. Our calculations yield the future
distribution, timing and level of cohort fertility that is associated with the fertility patterns
in the late 1990s after removing the distortions caused by the postponement of births.
The calculations in this paper, therefore, assume a constant level of fertility in the future,
which is not implausible given that—after removing tempo-distortions—the lifetime birth
probabilities of a ﬁrst and second child birth have remained substantially more constant
in the last two decades than is suggested by the observed fertility rates.
However, insomesense, thepostponementoffertilityimpliesthattherespectivecoun-
tries are accumulating a ‘demographic debt’ in terms of children who are postponed in the
future. The increase in cohort fertility that potentially occurs due to this ‘debt’, however,
requires that the socioeconomic context in the coming decades does not lead to declin-
ing incentives for having a ﬁrst or second child. Moreover, this needs to be true despite
the fact that fertility will concentrate at substantially higher ages and that women who
are going to have these children have substantially higher levels of human capital and
labor-market experience. The potential increase in cohort fertility therefore requires so-
cioeconomic changes so that later childbearing does not lead to a decline in the lifetime
desire for having a ﬁrst or second child (Kohler et al. 2001 a). A detailed investigation into
the respective social and economic changes, which are required in order to limit or prevent
a decline in the lifetime birth probabilities of one or two children even in the presence of
fertility aging, is far beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, these changes
almost certainly need to include a high compatibility of labor market participation and
childrearing.
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Notes
1. Many of these recent approaches have been inspired by earlier work on demographic
translation (Calot 1992; Foster 1990; Keilman 1994; Ryder 1964, 1980) and life-table or
parity progression measures of fertility (Feeney and Yu 1987; Henry 1972; Lutz 1989;
Park 1976; Rallu and Toulemon 1993).
2. The age of the synthetic cohort in the reference year is important for parity progression
measures in the postponement continues scenario. In particular, an ongoing postponement
has a larger effect on the fertility of younger cohorts since the postponement prevails for a
more prolonged time before the synthetic cohort reaches the primary ages of childbearing
(see KO for a further discussion and formal analysis).
3. In contrast, Ortega-Osona and Kohler (2002) ﬁnd a declining variance of rate schedules
at higher parities. This is compatible with a stable variance in the intensities since the
postponement of ﬁrst birth intensities is leading to the compression of birth rates at higher
parities.
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